Graded hypothesis theories  by Chatalic, Philippe et al.
Graded hypothesis theories 
ELSEVIER Theoretical Computer Science 17 I (1997) 247-280 
Theoretical 
Computer Science 
Philippe Chatalic”, Christine Froidevaux”, Camilla Schwindb,* 
a Lahoratoire de Recherche en Informatique, UA CNRS 410 But 490, UniaersitP Puri.y-Sud 
91405 Orsay Cedex, France 
’ Lahoratoire d’lnformatique de Marseille CNRS, FacultC des Sciences de Lumin~. 
Case 901 163 Avenue de Luminy, 13288 Marseille Cedes 9, France 
Abstract 
Reasoning about expert domains often involves imperfect knowledge. In such cases any piece 
of information may prove to be useful. This requires considering uncertain beliefs and sometimes, 
when the expected information is missing, making additional assumptions. This paper presents 
a qualitative approach, which allows for the simultaneous representation of uncertain and/or 
incomplete information. A running example illustrates the need for such a representation. The 
proposed framework is a multimodal logic in which uncertainty is represented by means of a set 
of partially ordered symbolic grades, expressed as modal operators. Assumptions are formulated 
as hypotheses in Siegel and Schwind’s hypothesis theory. We show that such hypotheses may be 
interpreted as constraints on the set of possible beliefs. We thus obtain a very natural integration 
of multimodal graded logic and hypothesis theory. We also study various properties of this 
formalism in presence of partial inconsistency. 
1. Motivations 
To achieve successful reasoning under imperfect information, it is generally necessary 
to take advantage of any kind of available knowledge. This includes true facts as well 
as less certain pieces of information, which may be considered as uncertain beliefs. 
Generally, such beliefs do not all have the same strength. For instance, one might 
have more confidence into the fact that a good student will succeed his exams than 
into the fact that a drunken person will safely drive back home. When using such 
beliefs in deductions, the characterization of the strength of the derived conclusions 
is an important issue. Many approaches for handling uncertain beliefs are based on 
numerical settings, e.g., Probability theory [31,32], Dempster-Shafer theory [39] and 
Possibility theory [45, 141. However, it is not always easy to give precise estimations of 
certainty degrees. In such cases, instead of giving precise values, experts often prefer 
using qualitative values to express that a statement is considered as more certain than 
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another. Several attempts have proposed qualitative views of numerical settings (e.g., 
[ 15, 17, 19,441). However, most of these approaches assume a total ordering among the 
set of grades. But there might be circumstances under which experts do not want to 
compare uncertain beliefs, either because it does not make sense, or because not enough 
information is available. A possible alternative is to express uncertain beliefs by means 
of a set of partially ordered qualitative grades, as already investigated in [16,6,5, 11. 
Another concern, when reasoning under incomplete information, is the case of miss- 
ing knowledge. Obtaining satisfactory conclusions often requires to make additional 
assumptions. For instance, a company may reasonably expect to receive some mail 
every working day. Such a rule is known to have exceptions (e.g. when the post is 
on strike), but if there is no particular evidence supporting such an exception, we 
generally assume that the situation is not exceptional, and perform the deduction hy 
default. It is generally assumed that the derived conclusions only hold as far as they 
do not contradict the facts and assumptions from which they are drawn. Many ap- 
proaches have been proposed for modelling such kind of reasoning under incomplete 
information, ranging from model preference logics (circumscription [29], conditional 
logics [I 1,22,26]), to fix point logics (default logic [2,35,36], modal nonmonotonic 
approaches [30,28,27]). As a further development of the logic of supposition [3], 
Siegel [40] has introduced a modal formalism with a syntactic notion of hypothesis, 
which has been further developed in [41,38] . 
Depending on the way incomplete information is formalized, i.e. by means of weigh- 
ted formulas or default assumptions, one may or not achieve defeasible reasoning. The 
two kinds of imperfections mentioned above are orthogonal but not mutually exclusive. 
For instance, in summer, a researcher might expect to receive some mail every day but, 
because of the general decrease of activity, even under normal circumstances there is 
still some possibility for him to find an empty mailbox. In such cases one would like 
to be able to derive such a conclusion, assuming the situation is not exceptional, but 
associated to some grade reflecting the level of certainty of the conclusion. Another 
motivation for using simultaneously these two kinds of incomplete knowledge is that 
it is generally not possible to consider all possible exceptions of a given default. In 
such a case, associating a default with some grade may be a way to express that even 
if none of the explicitly mentioned exceptional cases is encountered, there are still 
some other (omitted) cases where the conclusion may not hold. Therefore, the default 
conclusion may not be considered as certain. 
This paper presents a framework in which it is possible to handle incomplete infor- 
mation in two ways. Grades corresponding to various levels of support for beliefs 
are represented by modal operators as in [7,8]. Assumptions are represented as hypo- 
theses in the spirit of Siegel and Schwind’s hypothesis theory [40,41,38]. We show 
that by considering hypotheses as constraints on the set of possible beliefs, we obtain 
a very natural integration of multimodal graded logic and hypothesis theory. In this 
new framework, called graded hypothesis theory, the use of one or the other way of 
representing imperfect knowledge is related to the status of the derived conclusion, 
leading to either defeasible or non-defeasible graded deductions. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we introduce 
the multimodal graded logic and we prove its completeness and soundness. In the third 
section, graded hypothesis theory is introduced and its relationship to graded default 
logic is established. In the fourth section, we show how partial inconsistency can be 
handled in graded hypothesis theory. In Section 5 related work is discussed. 
2. The multimodal graded logic .z& 
2.1. E.upressiny uncertain beliefs 
Representing uncertain beliefs requires putting together two components, one for 
characterizing what is believed and another for characterizing how much it is believed. 
In multimodal graded logic [7, S] uncertain beliefs are expressed by means of modal 
formulas of the form [r]f. The formula f denotes what is believed and may be any 
formula of the language. The modal operator [x] is used to express that the formula 1’ 
is supported with at least some grade x 
When reasoning under uncertainty any piece of information may prove to be useful 
and it often happens that a given formula is supported in different ways. For instance, 
it might be supported by different sources of evidence or it might be obtained as the 
conclusion of different deductions. In a graded theory, a formula may thus be supported 
with different grades. For this reason, a grade cannot be used to represent the very 
certainty degree of a formula f. We assume that such a certainty degree exists but. 
since our knowledge is imperfect, we rather consider that grades only represent lower 
bounds of it (principle 1). 
Given a knowledge base and a formula J’, our aim is then to obtain as much 
information (i.e. support) as possible concerning f. Whenever a formula f‘ is supported 
in different ways, with different grades x1,. , r,, all these grades are lower bounds of 
the certainty degree of j”. As a consequence the least upper bound of all these grades, 
if it exists, must also be a lower bound of the certainty degree of f‘. Such a value may 
be used as a way to summarize all the amount of support concerning the formula f 
(principle 2 ). 
Another important concern, when considering uncertain beliefs, is the way levels of 
support are combined during deductions. It is generally considered as a good knowl- 
edge representation principle that a belief obtained as the conclusion of some deduction 
should not be more supported than each of the beliefs used in the deduction (princi- 
ple 3). When considering qualitative values for grades, this leads to consider the greatest 
lower bound of the grades used in the deduction. 
Expressing the initial set of beliefs requires associating grades with formulas and 
expressing that some formulas are more supported than others, i.e. that some grades are 
smaller than others. Therefore, we start from a finite and partially ordered set (Fo, < ). 
We assume the existence of a greatest (resp., smallest) element of ro represented by T 
(resp., I). It is further assumed that these two elements correspond, respectively, to 
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the highest possible level of support (i.e. total certainty) and the lowest possible level 
of support (i.e. empty support). However, because of the above-mentioned principles 2 
and 3, we need some richer structure in order to deal with least upper bounds and 
greatest lower bounds of sets of grades. Therefore, in the following we use as the set 
of grades the free distributive lattice (r, A, V, <) induced by (To, 6 ) [4], for which 
6 denotes the extended partial order relation on the extended set of grades r and A 
(resp. V) is called the meet (resp. join) operator. For any grades a,/I E f, the expres- 
sions c( V p and a A /? correspond, respectively, to the least upper bound (lub) and the 
greatest lower bound (glb) of !x and /3. Note that since ra is supposed to be finite, this 
is also the case for r. 
In the following we also denote by (r,,, A, <) the lower semi-lattice of r. This 
corresponds to elements of r that can be described by expression which do not use 
the operator V [4]. An important property of distributive lattices is that any grade may 
be described by an expression under disjunctive normal form. Formally this means that 
VM E r, 3rxi,...,q, E r, such that GI = c11 V... V ap and Vi, j, if i # j then Cli and aj 
are not comparable. 
2.2. The language of graded hypothesis theory 
Let (r, A, V, <) be a finite distributive lattice of grades. The language Y(Xr) is 
a multimodal extension of classical first-order logic, containing, for each grade c( of r, 
a modal operator [a]. Y(Xr) consists of a set of individual variables X, y,z, . . , a finite 
set of function symbols and a finite set of predicate symbols, including the zero-place 
predicates true and false. Terms and formulas are defined as usual and if p is a formula 
and a is a grade of r, then [alp is a formula. We call atomic formula or atom any 
positive literal. 
2.3. Axiomatic characterization of the multimodal ogic X)- 
We now introduce the system Cr, which is based on the modal system K, as a syn- 
tactical characterization of our multimodal logic Xr. 
Axiom schemes: 
(C) Classical axioms of predicate logic 
6) [aI@ -+ B) + ([alA + [aI@ 
(DT) l[T]false 
(AI) ([alA A [PIA> -+ [a v BM 
(AZ) [@]A --f [PIA V’a, /I E r such that p + a 
(A3 > P’d,lA) + [~IW’xA) 
Inference rules: 
(MP) “A;;; +B (modus ponens rule) 
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kc A 
(NR) FL [T]A (necessitation rule) 
(GR) 
rZA+B 
FL A + t’_xB 
provided x is not free in 
The symbols x and /3 refer to any element of r, and symbols A and B refer to any 
formulas. Theorems p of Cr are denoted by EZ p. As in [lo] we say that a formula (7 
is deducible or dtv%mhle from a set S of formulas (written S TV p) in C,. if and only 
A (generalization rule) 
if we can find a finite subset (41,. . , q,, } C S such that (41 A. . A qn ) + p is a theorem 
of Z,.. We denote by Thr(S) the set of formulas that may be derived from S. In the 
following, if S is finite, we shall also denote by SA the conjunction of all formulas 
of s. 
In Z,, the partial order on I- is expressed by means of the weakening axiom schemes 
AI (strict ordering is sufficient since p + p is a theorem of classical logic). This is 
a direct expression of principle 1. The axiom scheme Al expresses our second basic 
principle which states that, if there are two ways to deduce a given proposition with 
different grades, the level of support for this proposition should be at least as high as 
any of those grades. More generally, in the case where there are several derivations 
of a same formula with different grades, At will be used to obtain the best-possible 
grade, i.e. the greutest lower bound of the certainty degree of this formula. 
The parameterized modal operators [x] correspond to necessity operators in the sys- 
tem K [lo], except [T] which corresponds to the necessity operator of the system I). 
This comes from the axiom Dr, which expresses that any theory from which it IS 
possible to derive the contradiction with total certainty is inconsistent. Using Dr, it is 
possible to derive [T]A + l[T] 7 A. expressing that the accessibility relation corre- 
sponding to T is serial. 
The notion of consistency in Cr corresponds to the usual notion of consistency in 
modal logic. 
Definition 2.1. A set S of formulas is said to be inconsistent if and only if the formula 
“false” is deducible from S. Otherwise it is said to be consistent. 
In particular, the following property holds. 
Property 2.1. A set S offormulas is inconsistent if‘ und ml?> if‘ it bus u finite subset 
{q, . , q,,} such thut 
tp 7q1 v . . v lqn. 
It should be pointed out that the consistency of a set S of formulas does not imply 
the consistency of the set of beliefs expressed by S. Particularly, S may be consistent 
while allowing the formula [xlfalse (with x # T) to be derivable from S. This is rather 
satisfactory from the knowledge representation point of view, since with uncertain 
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knowledge we often have to deal with conflicting pieces of information [12,25]. We 
call such theories partially inconsistent theories [9]. 
Definition 2.2. A set S of formulas is x-inconsistent if and only if the formula [cc] false 
is deducible from S. Otherwise it is called a-consistent. 
It is easy to see that the following formulas are derivable in Cr. 
Property 2.2. 
(a) from t-x Al A...AA, + A we may infer t-z oAl A,..AoA,, -+ aA, (RK,,,) 
where G is any sequence of operators [a], [p],[y],... 
(b) l-1 o(A A B) H GA A CJB, where cr is any sequence of operators [xl, [PI, [y], . . 
(c) kr +a] 7 (A A B) --$ ~[a] 1 A 
(d) kZ [x](A --) B) A ~[a] 1 A --f +a] 1 B 
(e) FI ~[a] 1 (A -+ B) A [x]A + ~[z] 1 B 
(f) kr [x v PIA c--f [alA A [PIA 
(g> kz [alA A UW --) B) -+ [a A PIB (-%pp) 
The last axiom scheme (Agmp) clearly expresses our third basic principle and is related 
to the graded modus ponens rule introduced in [ 161. It allows for an easy formalization 
of deductions in theories with uncertain knowledge. 
As an immediate consequence of Property 2.2(f) we have: 
Property 2.3 (Chatalic and Froidevaux [S]). Let S be a set of gradedformulas over r, 
let x E r and xl V.. V xp be its disjunctive normal form, where Vi = 1 . . p, xi E r. 
Then S t--x [x]A ifs Vi = 1 , . p, S tz [xi] A. 
2.4. Examples 
We now consider several examples of deductions in Cr, in which uncertain beliefs 
are expressed by formulas of the form [x]f, with I + a -: T and certain beliefs by 
formulas of the form [T]f. Note that using a formula like [-L]S would amount to 
giving an empty support to f. In general, this is not very informative concerning f. 
However, there are some cases where such a formula may be used to express some 
kind of preference for f over lj’, without giving real support to f. We shall see in 
the next section that this may be of some interest in order to block the addition of 
hypotheses. 
Example 2.1. It seems reasonable to believe that a person who has a paper accepted 
for a presentation at a conference will be attending this conference. We might also 
consider that a person who is very active in the field of this conference will be attending 
the conference. Suppose we believe that John is an active researcher in the field of 
a conference and that he submitted a paper, at least one review of which is known to 
be very good. Therefore, we also have some reason to believe that his paper will be 
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accepted. 
S = { [x]active( john, field(c)), [P]accepted_paper( john, c), 
[;j](accepted_paper(X, Y) + attend(X, Y )), 
[S](activefX, field(Y)) --+ attend(X, Y))}. 
Let us assume we cannot compare a(,~, [j and 6 but that I 4 X, y, b, 6. Then using 
(A,,,) we have: 
(1) t-z ([x]active(john, field(c)) A [G](active(X, field(Y)) - attendoi: Y ))) - 
[z A ?j]attend(john,c) (C + A,,) 
(2) tx ([/?]accepted_paper(john, c) A [y](accepted_paper(X, Y) -+ attend(X. Y )) ) - 
[[i A y]attend(john,c) (C + A,,,) 
and thus using (A,) and properties of classical logic: 
(3) kz Sr,-+ [(rr\J)v(flr\y)]attend(_john, c) i.e. S,, t-z [(xAd)V(fiAy)]attend(john, c). 
Thus we may derive the fact attend(john, c) with the grade (X A 6) V (p A 7) and this 
is the greatest grade that can be obtained for attend(john, c). This example illustrates 
the need for principle 3. Principle 2 makes it possible to reinforce that belief, which 
is supported by two independent facts: he is active in the field and he has probably an 
accepted paper. 
The second example justifies the need for the distributivity property. 
Example 2.2. Let us suppose now that Paul has submitted two papers which are known 
to have good chances to be accepted. Then, we have two different reasons to believe 
that Paul will have a paper accepted, with different degrees cx and /I. Thus we have 
S = { [a]accepted_paper(paul, c), [P]accepted_paper(paul, c), 
[;I]( accepted_paper(X, Y) + attend(X Y ) )}. 
We still assume that M,P, 7/ are not comparable. We consider the following two graded 
deductions: 
(,a) 1 FE ([a]accepted_paper(paul, c) A [;j](accepted_paper(X Y) - attend@? Y J)) 
-+ [x A y] attend( Paul, c) ( Agmp )
2 tx ([P]accepted_paper(paul, c) A [;!](accepted_paper(X, Y ) + attend(X Y 1 I) 
- [fi A ;I]attend(paul, c) (Agmp) 
hence Sh t [(a A y) v (,!I h Y)]attend(paul,c) (A, and m-p.). 
(b) 1 k1: ([x]accepted_paper(paul, c), A [P]acceptehpaper(paul, c)) + [a v placcep- 
ted-paper(pau1, c) (Al ) 
2 ET ([xv/?]accepted_paper(paul, c)~[y](accepted_paper(X, Y) - attend(X Y )I) 
4 I:( x V [I) A :I]attend(paul, c) (Agmp) 
hence S,, FL [(01 V 0) A y]attend(paul, c), 
But since the lattice is distributive, we have: (X A ;:) V (/I r\ ;:) = (u V fl) r\ 7. More 
generally, the distributivity property makes it possible to apply the inference rules in 
any order. 
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The third example motivates the use of a greatest lower bound for noncomparable 
grades. 
Example 2.3. In this example, John must go to the theatre and is afraid of possible 
traffic jams which would probably cause him to arrive late at the theatre. Moreover, 
he has a lot of work and thus little chance to finish his work early. But if he still 
manages to finish early, he might go to the restaurant before going to the theatre. This 
may be formalized by 
S = { [altraffic-jams, [6]finish_early(john), [/?](traffic-jams ---f late-theatre(john)), 
[y](finish-early(john) + restaurant(john))}. 
This time we assume that y < z and 6 < /3 and nothing else. We obtain: 
(1) tz ([srltraffic-jams A [P](traffic-jams + late-theatre( john))) --+ [x A /3]late-thea- 
tre(john) (Aamp) 
(2) Fr ([6]finishhearly(john) A [y](finiskearly(john) ---) restaurant(john))) ---f 
[6 A y]restaurant(john) (Agmp) 
hence Sr\ FL [a A PIlate-theatre(john) A [6 A y]restaurant(john). 
Notice that c( and p (resp. y and 6) are not comparable, but that we are still able to 
compare the greatest lower bounds for late-theatre and restaurant. And since 6 A y + 
x A /?, we have more confidence into the fact that John will be late at the theatre than 
into the fact that he will go to the restaurant. 
The last example illustrates the use of more complex modal formulas involving 
nested beliefs, to express mutual beliefs in a multiagent context. 
Example 2.4. Some agent John expresses his degree of confidence into the point of 
view of agent Mike: John is almost certain (CIJ) that if Mike is quite certain (PM) that 
Tom will not come tonight, then Mike thinks that it is highly likely (7~) that Mary 
will not come. Moreover, John is rather convinced (a;) that Mike is quite certain that 
Tom will not come tonight. 
We assume that U; < NJ. 
We obtain the set of formulas 
S = { [a~]( [&I 7 coming(tom) -+ [ye] 7 coming(mary)), [dli] [&I 1 coming(tom)}. 
Since CC: 6 aJ by axiom A2 we get 
k [aJ]([/h] 1 coming(tom) --) [YM] 1 coming(mary)) + [f$]([&] 7 coming(tom) 
---f [ye] 7 coming(mary)). 
Then using (K) we have 
F S + ([a;][&] 1 coming(tom) --t [a;][y~] 1 coming(mary)). 
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Hence, 
S 4 [cx~][~~,] 7 coming(mary). 
In conclusion, John is rather convinced that Mike thinks that it is highly likely that 
Mary will not come. 
2.5. Stwantiud characterization of Ar 
In this section we define the meaning of formulas in terms of possible worlds se- 
mantics [23] involving families of accessibility relations. With each grade a E r, we 
associate an accessibility relation R,. Our intuition is that the higher is the grade as- 
sociated with a formula, the more constraining the corresponding accessibility relation 
should be. We express this idea by the fact that if x < /I then R, c R,). In such a case, 
from a given possible world w, if there are more possible worlds accessible through I?,, 
than through R,, it will be more difficult to satisfy the formula [fi]p than the formula 
[r]p in r~. 
2.5.1. Graded interpretations 
We first introduce the notion of %r-structures as follows. 
Definition 2.3. Let (r, A,V, 5) be a distributive lattice of grades. A Xr-stuuctuw is 
defined as a triple S = (W,Z!(R~)~~~) such that: 
l W is a nonempty set of possible worlds. 
l .d is an assignment function mapping every possible world w into a classical first- 
order structure &(w) = (O,F,&,,P,+,) such that 0 is a domain of objects, F,, is a set 
of operations on 0 and P, is a set of relations on 0. 
l (Rr)gE~ is a family of binary accessibility relations (i.e. subsets of W x W)) veri- 
fying: 
(i) Vix,p~ r, if x=$/? then R,CRIj 
(ii) b B E r, Rx”0 L R, U Rp 
(iii) RT is serial (i.e., VW E W, 3~’ E W such that RT(u~,w’)). 
The notion of r-interpretation on a &r-structure is defined as usual for first-order 
formulas. In particular, a formula of Y(.+) of the form [z]A is true at a world pi for 
an interpretation I iff for all w’ E W, R,(w, w’) implies I, w’ k A. An open formula of 
.‘/‘(.#r) is said to be true at a world M/ for the interpretation I iff every of its closed 
instances is true at w for I. An immediate consequence for the previous definition is 
that V’r,p E I’, RNvB = R, u RB. 
The notions of satisfiability and validity are then defined as usual in modal logic 
[10,21]. 
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Definition 2.4. 
l A formula A is satisjiable iff there exists a r-interpretation I based on a Xr-structure 
S = (w,MWa~r) d an a world w E W, such that there exists some instance of A 
which is true in w. 
l Let I be a r-interpretation on some &$-structure S = ( W,XZ(R,)~~~) and let 
w E W. A formula A is valid in I at the world w iff every instance of A is true 
in w. 
l A formula A is valid in I (written I /= A) iff it is valid in any world of W. Then 
we say that I is a r-model of A. 
l A formula A is valid (written k A) iff every r-interpretation is a r-model of A. 
The previous definitions may be extended to sets of formulas. In the following, when 
there is no ambiguity, the interpretation I will not be mentioned any more and we shall 
merely write w b f instead of Z, w /= f. 
2.5.2. Soundness and completeness of Cr 
The system can be proven to be sound and complete with respect to the semantics 
defined above. 
Theorem 2.1. TV A if and only if + A. 
The core of the proof may be found in the appendix. 
3. Graded hypothesis theories 
The multimodal logic presented so far is monotonic and gives the possibility to 
characterize levels of certainty associated to initial or derived formulas. In this section 
we introduce the notion of hypothesis to allow for making additional assumptions in 
the case of incomplete information. Since this notion is in the spirit of Siegel and 
Schwind’s hypothesis theory [41,38], we recall the main ideas and properties of this 
formalism. 
Hypothesis theory is a modal logic-based formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning 
comprising two modal operators L and H. The first one is used for expressing what is 
known and the second one is used for expressing what can be hypothesized. Although 
there is some relation between these two modal operators, it should be stressed that H 
is not the dual operator of L. Actually, L is a necessity operator based on the modal 
system T, including the axiom Lp --) p (what is known is true). The relationship 
between L and H is given by Hp ---f 7 imp which means that what is hypothesized, 
cannot be known to be false or, by contraposition, that if q is known then Tq cannot be 
hypothesized. It should be pointed out that the converse of this axiom (~Llp + Hp) 
does not hold: it can be the case that up is not known and p is not hypothesized. This 
is the reason why H cannot be defined as the dual operator of L but is defined as a dual 
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operator of another - weaker - modal operator. In [38], a complete axiomatization for 
this system is given, with H being defined as -[HIT, where [H] denotes a necessity 
modal operator based on the modal system K. The relationship between L and [H] is 
then expressed by the axiom Lp -+ [H]p (which is equivalent to Hp + TL-p). 
The main idea of Siegel and Schwind’s hypothesis theory is to try to augment a 
set S of formulas by adding hypotheses of a set Hyp, while preserving consistency. 
Intuitively, S represents our basic knowledge, i.e. formulas that are taken for granted, 
while Hyp represents a set of possible assumptions that may be stated in the case of 
incomplete knowledge, provided they remain consistent with S. Hypotheses of Hyp arc 
formulas of the form Hp where p is a ground formula (i.e. without free variables). The 
differences in the way these two sets of formulas are used is formalized by the notion 
of extension, defined as a maximal consistent subset of F U Hyp containing F. Adding 
hypotheses or assumptions in this way is a common approach to nonmonotonicity and is 
very similar to Poole’s default extensions [34]. Hypothesis theories enjoy two important 
properties: the existence of at least one extension and the compactness property (which 
relies on the compactness of the underlying modal system). 
The present approach is similar to the one of [38], concerning the notion of extension 
but differs essentially on two points. First, we use a family of modal operators [x] to 
denote what is believed instead of a single modal operator L to characterize what is 
known. The second difference is that since [38] is concerned with what is known, 
the necessity operator L follows the rule of the system T [lo]. This is justified by 
the fact that what is known should be consistent with the true facts. In our approach. 
since we agree to have partially inconsistent beliefs, our parameterized modal operators 
[x] (resp. [T]) follow the rules of the modal system K (resp. II). Moreover in our 
approach, hypotheses are given a clear interpretation, with respect to uncertain beliefs, 
which does not require to introduce a specific modal operator [H] since this role may 
be played by any [x] for x # T. 
3.1. Hypotheses us constraints on sets of belieji 
Let us consider a graded formula of the form -[xl-p. In a consistent theory. the 
presence of such a formula expresses that the formula up is not supported with the 
grade CC. Since from l[cr]lp, we can conclude -[&p, whenever CI < fi, this means 
that -p is also not supported by any degree /I greater than CC. This does not imply that 
the formula lp is not supported at all, but that if -p is supported, it must be with 
some grade fl such that CC~ p. Thus the presence of such a formula -[xl-p can be 
considered as a form of constraint on the set of levels of possible beliefs concerning 7~). 
The lower is the grade r the stronger is the constraint. 
The extreme case is the situation where c( = 1. Since 1 is a universal lower bound 
for f, 1_ < p for all p E r. Since from l[i]-p, we can conclude l[fl]-p, for any /j, 
this means that lp is not supported at all. Otherwise from [PI-p it would be possible 
to derive [i]lp by weakening and this would lead to an inconsistency. Let us notice 
that although ~[l]-p does not express any explicit belief in favor of the formula p, it 
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rejects any possible belief supporting up. This may be considered as a way of assuming 
the formula although not giving any explicit support in it. Such a formula is at the 
same time weaker and stronger than a formula like [I]p. It is weaker in the sense that 
it does not express any explicit support in p, while [l.]p does (even if it corresponds 
to an empty support). But it is much stronger in the sense that it prevents any possible 
support in up, while [i]p does not. With [i]p we may consistently support [a]~p, 
which would just lead to a partial inconsistency where the level of inconsistency would 
be I (i.e. the lowest possible one). Thus, the presence of a formula of the form [I]p 
might rather be considered as a way to express that, although there is no strict evidence 
in favor of p, we have some preference for the formula p over up. 
Clearly, a formula like l[I] lp is closely related to the hypothesis Hp in hypoth- 
esis theory [38]. Adding a formula l[I] up to a multimodal graded theory obviously 
amounts to adding a hypothesis in hypothesis theory. It can be considered as a con- 
straint that is added to an initial theory and that rejects any belief supporting the 
proposition up. Let us notice that while the original hypothesis theory requires the 
introduction of a specific modal operator [H] to express a hypothesis Hp as l[H] up, 
this is not necessary in our approach. Indeed, thanks to the axiom scheme (AZ) and 
the fact that I is a universal lower bound of r, for all grades a E r, we have 
-[1] up -+ ~[a] up. Moreover there is no reason to restrict to the case of hypothe- 
ses of the form -[1] lp. We might also consider to have weaker constraints of the 
general form ~[a] lp, expressing that if the formula up is ever supported it cannot 
be with a grade /3 such that a 5 /?. In the following, to keep close with Siegel and 
Schwind’s original notations, we shall also use the notation (HJp to represent the 
formula ~[a] up, and we simply use (H) in place of (H_L). From the semantical point 
of view, a r-interpretation is thus a model of a hypothesis (H,)p if from any possible 
world, there exists at least one possible world, accessible by R,, in which p is true. 
This seems intuitively satisfactory. Moreover, the smaller is the grade, the smaller is 
the corresponding accessibility relation and thus, the more difficult it is to find such a 
world. This corresponds to the fact that the smaller the grade of the hypothesis, the 
stronger is the constraint corresponding to the hypothesis. 
3.2. Formalizing graded hypothesis theories 
In the rest of this section we show how multimodal graded logic may be extended in 
order to incorporate this notion of hypothesis and show that most results of hypothesis 
theory are preserved in their graded version. 
Definition 3.1. A graded hypothesis theory is a pair HT = (S,Hyp) where: 
0 S is a set of formulas of Y(yioy ) 
l Hyp is a set of hypothesis (NN) f = +x] -f, with a E r, and J’ E Y(.%-). 
Given a graded hypothesis theory (S,Hyp), we are interested in the characterization 
of sets of hypotheses from Hyp that are consistent with S. An extension is thus obtained 
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by successive additions to S of new hypotheses from Hyp, while preserving consistency. 
until no more hypothesis may be added. 
Definition 3.2. An extension of a graded hypothesis theory HT = (S, Hyp) is a set 
E = Thz(S U H) where H C Hyp is a maximal subset of Hyp consistent with S. 
Example 3.1. Let us consider a given student, supposed to be a good student. We also 
think that, if this student is good and if it is possible to make the hypothesis that he 
has worked hard to prepare his exams, then he is likely to pass his exams. This can 
be expressed by the hypothesis theory HT=(S, Hyp) defined as follows: 
S = { ( [ T]good_student~ (H) worked-hard) - [alpasssexams, [ T]good~_student }
Hyp = { (H)worked-hard}. 
Since nothing contradicts the hypothesis (H)workedhard. the theory HT has exactly 
one extension E which contains the formula [zlpasssexams. 
Now, let us suppose we have also heard from another person that this student spent 
all the days before the exam at the swimming pool. We might then reasonably believe 
(but we cannot be certain of that) that he did not work hard. This can be expressed 
by adding to S the formula [fi] 1 worked-hard. But from [/I] 1 worked-hard, it is pos- 
sible to derive [i] -, worked-hard (since I < /I) and recall that (H)worked-hard z 
-[1] 1 worked-hard. Therefore, it is no more possible to make the hypothesis (H) 
worked-hard, since this would lead to an inconsistency. Thus the only possible exten- 
sion of HT is reduced to the set of theorems of S. 
As it can be seen in this example, adding a new formula f’ to the set S may have 
an incidence on the set of possible extensions. It may cause some hypothesis, that was 
previously in some extension of S, to be no more consistent with the new set of beliefs 
S U { ,j’}. This exhibits the nonmonotonic behavior of this approach. 
In standard hypothesis theory [41,38], it is possible to have a hypothesis theory 
which admits one extension containing both hypotheses Hp and H lp. Hypothesis 
theories behave in this respect like default theories, where it is possible to justify some 
facts by the impossibility to derive a fact p and to justify other facts ~ in the same 
extension ~ by the impossibility to derive -p. Graded hypothesis theories behave in 
the same way. This can be illustrated by the following example. 
Example 3.2. We believe that serious people usually work hard. On the other hand, 
we think that usually they sleep during the night. We have two hypotheses, namely 
that Mary is serious and also that she does not always sleep the night. This may be 
formalized by a hypothesis theory of the form HT = (S, Hyp): 
S = { [fl](serious(x) --f sleeps(x))) 
Hyp = { (H,)serious(Mary), (Hlj) 1 sleeps(Mary)}. 
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Let us suppose a < p. HT admits one extension containing (Hg)serious(Mary), because 
it is consistent to add (H,)serious(Mary), as well as (HP) 7 serious(Mary), the latter 
being derivable by contraposition from S and (HP) 7 sleeps(Mary). 
The next example illustrates the need for different levels of hypotheses. 
Example 3.3. Tom is about having lunch at the cafeteria when Bob comes saying that 
it is not open today. However, Bob is often joking and Tom gives only little support 
to the fact that the cafeteria might be closed. As far as there is not enough support into 
the fact that the cafeteria is closed. Tom still thinks preferable to go to the cafeteria 
and check by himself. This may be formalized by a hypothesis theory of the form: 
S = { (H,)open -+ [ T]go_to-cafeteria, [p] 1 open} 
HYP = {(Kbpen). 
Let us suppose /I < a. Then it is strongly consistent to add the hypothesis (H,)open to 
S. The extension will then contain formulas of the form [y] 1 open, for any y < /I, and 
+6] 1 open, for any c( < 6. But this does not entail any inconsistency (neither strong 
nor partial inconsistency) and thus the extension contains [ T]go_to-cafeteria. 
Let us suppose that Tom meets another person (more confident) who also tells 
him that the cafeteria is probably closed today. Then we have S = {(H,)open -+ 
[ T]go_to-cafeteria, [/?I 1 open, [n] 1 open} from which we may derive [p V A] 1 open. 
If cx < /3 V 3, then it is no more possible to consistently add the hypothesis (H,)open. 
As for hypothesis theories, we may state a sufficient condition for the existence of 
extensions. 
Theorem 3.1. Let HT = (S,Hyp) be a hypothesis theory. Zf S is consistent then HT 
has an extension. 
The proof is analogous to the one in [41]. As pointed out in [41], this implies that 
extending the set Hyp of hypotheses of a graded hypothesis theory can augment the 
content of extensions, can yield more extensions but will never eliminate any of the 
previous extensions. 
Other results of [41] still valid in the graded version are the compactness property 
and the fixpoint characterization of extensions that follow from the definition. 
Theorem 3.2. Let HT = (S, Hyp) be a graded hypothesis theory and let f be a formula 
of qyi”r ). 
(1) let E = Thr(S U H) be an extension of HT. 
Then f EE ifSSl{hl, . . . . h,}CH such that f EThr(SU{hl,..., hn}). 
(2) f is a theorem of some extension E of HT ifs Zl{hl,. . . , h,} & Hyp such that 
f ETh,r(S u {hl,. . , h,}) and S U {hl,. . . , h,} is consistent. 
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The proof is analogous to the one in [41] except the fact that it relies on the compact- 
ness of K. 
Theorem 3.3. Let HT = (S,Hyp) be u graded hypothesis theory and E an extension 
of HT. Then E is a solution of the recursive equution: 
E = ThZ(Su {hEHyp: lh GE}) 
Corollary 3.1. [f’E is an extension of S in (S, Hyp), then ,for u/l h E Hyp, either h E E 
or ThEE. 
Again the proofs are direct adaptations of those in [41,38]. 
3.3. Relation \vith graded default logic 
Another formalism has been introduced in [6,8] that makes it possible to handle 
simultaneously uncertain and incomplete knowledge. A graded formula is then repre- 
sented by a pair (p x), where p is a classical propositional formula and CI is a grade 
on the lattice I-. In order to avoid ambiguities we shall refer this former work as the 
clussicul gruded logic approach, as opposed to the multimodul graded logic approach. 
Nonmonotonic behaviour is achieved by classical defaults [35,2], which are associated 
with grades, in a similar way, and by applying the principle of graded modus po- 
nens to default inference. In this part we exhibit some correspondences between both 
approaches for the propositional case. 
The axiom system of classical graded logic (denoted here by 3-r) is composed of 
classical axioms schemes of propositional logic (graded by T) and three inference rules 
denoted, respectively, by 
(pY;gy(;;)qB) (MPG) 
(pm) 
(p&VP + x (WR) 
graded modus ponens rule weakening rule 
strengthening rule 
It has been shown in [5] that there are some correspondences between classical graded 
logic and multimodal graded logic, as well as between graded default theories and 
graded hypothesis theories. 
The idea is to define a mapping 0, which transforms a classical graded theory 
S into a corresponding multimodal graded theory MS, by translating every graded 
proposition (p LX) of S into the corresponding modal formula [r]p. Then, if we denote 
the derivability in 3r by ks it has been established that: 
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Theorem 3.4 (Chatalic [5]). Let S be a set of classical graded formulas and MS = 
O(S) its translation into multimodal graded logic. Then 
In [41] a correspondence between Reiter’s default logic and hypothesis theories is 
established. Given the existing link between classical graded logic and multimodal 
graded logic, this suggests a similar correspondence between graded default theories 
and graded hypothesis theories. 
Recall that in Reiter’s approach [35] a default d is a specific nonmonotonic infer- 
ence rule of the form (p: q/r), where p, q and r are elements of P; p is called the 
prerequisite of d, q its justzjication and r its consequent. We use Pre(D), Just(D) and 
Cons(D) to denote, respectively, the set of prerequisites, justifications and consequents 
of a set of defaults D. A graded default is defined as a pair (da), where d is a clas- 
sical default and CI a grade. As for a classical default, p and q are called, respectively, 
the prerequisite and the justification of d. A graded default theory A is then defined as 
a pair (W,D), where W is a set of graded formulas and D is a set of graded defaults. 
The approach followed by [6] consists in generalizing the principle of graded in- 
ference (principle 2) to the case of default inference. A default (p: q/r 8) may be 
triggered if its prerequisite p is believed with some grade c( and if nothing contradicts 
q (i.e. if Tq is not believed at all). Then r is inferred with the grade a A B. In contrast 
with classical defaults, if the prerequisite of a graded default is supported with different 
grades, this default may produce different consequents according to the different grades 
supporting its prerequisite. Extensions of a graded default theory are then characterized 
by the following fixpoint definition: 
Definition 3.3. Let A = (W, D) be a graded default theory. Let E be a set of graded 
formulas. The sequence (Ei),>o is defined as follows: 
EO = W and for i 3 0, 
Ei+z =Th~(Ei)U{(r~A~)(p: q/rB)ED,(pcc)EE, and -q$E}. 
E is a graded extension for A iff E = U Ei. 
ia 
In this definition S denotes the support of a set of graded formulas S, i.e. the set of 
formulas of S without their grades. It has been shown in [6] that graded extensions 
are closely related to classical extensions of a non-graded default theory. In particular, 
the support of each extension of A corresponds to an extension of the support of A 
and conversely. 
One important result reported in [41] is the relationship between Reiter’s default 
logic and hypothesis theory. Indeed default theories may be embedded into hypothesis 
theories with a simple criterium for the existence of extensions. A default (p: q/r) is 
translated into the modal formal Lp A Hq --f Lr. A default theory (W, D) is translated 
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into the hypothesis theory (WL,Hyp), where WL = {Lw: w E W} U {Lp A Hq - 
Lr: (p: q/v) E D} and Hyp = {Hq: (p : q/v) E D}. Given a hypothesis theory HT 
which is a translation of a default theory A, it has been shown that A has an extension 
iff HT has an extension which contains L lp whenever it contains 7Hp. 
Concerning the correspondence between graded default theories and graded hypothe- 
sis theories, one has first to notice a little difference between the sets of grades used in 
both approaches. Graded default theories A are characterized with only strictly “posi- 
tive” grades. i.e. grades of P = T\(i), while graded hypothesis theories use the full 
range r. One way to overcome this technical problem is to consider that although the 
set of grades used in A does not contain 1, we still express A as a graded default 
theory based on a set of grades r [Ch 61. To avoid ambiguities, we rather denote by 
A+, the initial graded default theory based on the set of grades Tt and by A the same 
graded default theory described on the whole set of grades r. Then, it may be shown 
that as far as _L is not used in the characterization of a set of formulas S, a formula p 
is derivable from S with the grade i if and only if it is derivable from S with some 
grade a E I-+. More generally, it may be shown that: 
Property 3.1 (Chatalic [5]). Let S he u srt qlf‘ ymded ,fi~mulus such thut V( p r ) ES. 
rEr+, 
Th,-r (S) = Thsr(S)“, ,ohere ThZr(S)+ = {(pcn)~Th,~(S): x(EJ-+}. 
The mapping 0 may now be extended in order to translate any graded default theory 
A = (IV, D) into a corresponding multimodal graded theory O(A) = (S, Hyp) defined 
as 
@(WI = {[alp: (PX)E w> 
HYP = {(H)p: PE just(D)) 
In this mapping, to preserve the principle of graded inference, a graded default 
(p: q/r x) is translated into a set of formulas of the form [y]p A (H)q + [;‘]r with 
;.’ < x. For convenience, we may represent such a set of formulas by an axiom scheme 
of the form [x]p A (H)q -+ [x A I]Y. Note that the formula [cc]p A (H)q + [r]r alone 
would not be sufficient since in such a case it would be impossible to infer anything 
from [B]p if x # /3. The set of hypotheses of the translation corresponds to the set of 
justifications of the defaults of D. 
Now we are able to state the correspondence theorems. Roughly, the idea is that to 
any consistent extension E of a graded default theory A+, corresponds some extension 
E’ of @(A+) such that the set of hypotheses characterizing the extension E’ corresponds 
precisely to the set of justifications of the defaults compatible with E. 
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Theorem 3.5 (Chatalic [5]). Let A+ = (W,D) be a graded default theory and HT = 
(S, Hyp) be its translation into hypothesis theory. Let E+ be a consistent extension 
of A+, and let 
H(E+) = {W)plpEJW~) and bar+, (-PY) @E+}, 
(1) E’ = Thz(S U H(E+)) is an extension of HT, 
(2) E+ = {(p cc) : a E r+, [alp E E’ and p is a non-modal formula), 
(3) Zf ~(Hjp6E’ then 3a~P such that [a]lp~E’. 
The latter point is an extension to the graded case of the property introduced in [41] and 
mentioned above, which establishes the link between extensions of hypothesis theories 
and of default theories. 
Theorem 3.6 (Chatalic [6]). Let A+ = (W,D) be a default theory and HT = (S, Hyp) 
be its translation. 
Let E’ be an extension of HT such that if T(H)q EE’ then 3y E r+, [y] 7 q EE’. 
Then there exists an extension E+ of A+, such that: 
E+ = {(psr): r~r+, [cc]p~E’ and p is a non-modal formula). 
3.4. A more complex example 
In this section we consider a more comprehensive example which illustrates the use 
of weaker constraints as hypotheses. 
Example 3.4. Mr. Johnson has been murdered today between 10 and 11 a.m. The 
police is investigating. The few clues gathered at the moment are the following ones: 
l Any person having a good motive is suspected, unless helshe has an alibi. 
l Any person that has been seen in the area of Mr. Johnson’s House at the time of 
the crime is also suspected by default. 
l Mr. Angel had a strong argument with Mr. Johnson two days ago concerning 
money problems. 
l The police considers as plausible that quarrels about money might be a good 
motive. 
l Mrs. Angel certijes her husband spent the whole day with her at his home which 
would give him an alibi. 
l Joan (the cleaning lady) has been working at Mr. Johnson’s house all the morning. 
l The postman has seen Mr. Johnson alive just before 10 a.m. 
This example involves different kinds of beliefs: 
l Certain beliefs: 
_ the fact that Mr. Angel had a strong argument with Mr. Johnson, 
_ the fact that Joan was in the area of the crime at that time, 
- and also the fact that if Mr. Angel was at home at that time then he has an alibi. 
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l Uncertain beliefs: 
- the fact that a quarrel might be considered as a good motive for such a crime, 
_ the fact that Mr. Angel was at home at that time, 
._ the fact that the postman might still have been in the area at that time. 
l Defaults: 
_ the fact that a person with a motive is suspected unless he/she has an alibi, 
_ the fact that a person in the area of Mr. Johnson’s House at the time of the crime 
is also suspected. 
All these elements are not equally supported. For instance we will probably give 
more credit to the fact that a quarrel is a good motive, than to the fact that the 
postman was in the area at the time of the crime. Concerning defaults, one may agree 
that the fact of being suspected will be more supported in the case where the person has 
a motive. than in the case where he/she just was in the area at that time. Eventually, 
since this has been reported by his wife, the fact that Mr. Angel was at home should 
be less supported than any other fact. 
This may be formalized by the graded hypothesis theory HT = (S,Hyp), where 
S = { [ T]quarrel(angel), [T]in-area(joan), [ T](at_bome(angel) + alibi(ange1)). 
[a](quarrel(X) --t motive(X)), [/3]in_area(postman). [co]at-home( angel ), 
[x]motive(X) A (H) 7 alibi(X) 4 [S A x]suspect(X), [x]in-area(X) A 
(H)suspect(X) -+ [y A x]suspect(X)} 
with the initial partial ordering I+ w + /)’ + 3 < T and o 4 ;’ -X d 4 T and Hyp = 
{(H) 7 alibi(angel), (H)suspect(joan), (H)suspect(postman)}. 
From this theory, it is possible to derive [cc]motive(angel) as well as [o]alibi(angel). 
From the latter we may infer by weakening [I]alibi(angel). This prevents us from 
adding the hypothesis (H) 1 alibi(ange1). Using the second default it is possible to 
derive [y]suspect(joan) as well as [/I A y]suspect(postman). 
This conclusion might not correspond exactly to the expected result. Actually, the 
reason why Mr. Angel is not suspected is that he is believed to have an alibi. But the 
level of support of this alibi is likely to be weak in comparison with the other grades 
of the lattice. The rule [x]motive(X) A (H) 7 alibi(X) + [6 Ax]suspect(X) is blocked 
because the hypothesis expressed in the condition is very strong. Using (H) -7 alibi(X ) 
means that there must be absolutely no evidence supporting the fact that X has an alibi. 
In the present situation, one would clearly prefer to still apply this default, despite the 
weak evidence supporting Angel’s alibi. 
A possible way to relax the constraint expressed by such a hypothesis is to consider a 
weaker form of hypotheses like (H,) 1 alibi(X). Such a constraint, means that alibi(X) 
should not be supported with a grade greater than c. Thus, this is still consistent with 
some evidence supporting alibi(X) provided the corresponding level of support is not 
greater than i-:. 
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Let us replace the previous rule by [x]motive(X) A (HE) 1 alibi(X) -+ [6 A xlsuspect 
(X) such that EA CO. Then it is now consistent to make the hypothesis (Z&)1 alibi(ange1) 
and we may derive [6Aa]suspect(angel) as an additional conclusion. Let us notice that 
the corresponding grade is greater than the level of support for the suspicion of Joan 
and of the postman, which seems to be closer to our expectations. 
Through this example, we have seen that the use of weaker hypotheses may be a way 
to express some form of tolerance on default justifications. It should be noticed that 
such a tolerance is expressed locally and may be adapted according to each such rule. 
4. Partial inconsistency 
Working under incomplete information often leads to gather evidence from different 
sources. It sometimes happens that several sources do not agree on all the facts, which 
results in partial inconsistency of the gathered beliefs. As mentioned in Section 2, this 
form of inconsistency is supported in some way by the logic, Xr, since it is possible 
to have consistent theories (in the usual sense) involving partially inconsistent beliefs. 
In this section we study how this notion of partial inconsistency interacts with the 
notion of hypotheses. 
4. I. Several examples involving partial inconsistency 
Recall that a theory S is called a-inconsistent whenever S t, [alfalse. But in Cr, 
for any formula f, false -+ f is a theorem and thus [alfalse + [IX]~ (by RR). As 
a consequence, in an a-inconsistent theory S any formula of the form [a]f may be 
trivially derived. In such a theory it is thus (strongly) inconsistent to add any hypotheses 
of the form (Hp)f with p < a. As a matter of fact, this would amount to adding the 
formula ~[p] -f. But if the theory is a-inconsistent then [CC] lf is trivially derivable. 
By weakening, this entails [/?I -f and thus a contradiction. 
Example 4.1. We extend Example 3.3 by considering that it is generally the case that 
when somebody’s telephone answering machine is on, this person is not at home. Let 
us suppose that it has been reported that Mr. Angel’s answering machine was on at 
the time of the crime. We now have the theory: 
S = { [ T]quarrel(angel), [ T]in-area(joan), [ T]phone_answ-on(angel), 
[/?]in-area(postman), [m]athome(angel), 
[ T](athome(angel) -+ alibi(angel)), 
[a](quarrel(X) + motive(X)), 
[p](phone_answ-on(X) -+ 1 athome(X 
[x]motive(X) A (HE) 1 alibi(X) --+ [6 A x]suspect(X), 
[x]in-area(X) A (H)suspect(X) + [y A x]suspect(X)} 
Hyp = {(HE) 7 alibi(angle), (H)suspect(joan), (H)suspect(postman)}. 
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Recall that i-: LU < p < r -: T and w + y -X 6 4 T. We choose p such that 
p -: p + T and y + p and E such that E$U. 
From this theory we may now derive [p] 1 athome( angel) and [w]athome(angel) 
and thus [wlfalse. It is thus possible to derive [w] 1 suspect(joan) and thus by weaken- 
ing [_L] 1 suspect(joan). Similarly we may derive [_L] 1 suspect(postman). Therefore, it 
is no more possible to add the hypotheses (H)suspect(joan) and (H)suspect(postman ). 
Conversely, as far as E $ o, is not possible to derive [e] 1 alibi(ange1) thus it is still 
consistent to add (H,) 7 alibi(ange1). Thus in this example we obtain one extension 
which is o-inconsistent. 
We may notice that in the previous example, the two hypotheses that have been 
rejected are not directly related with the cause of partial inconsistency. 
More generally, a side-effect of a-inconsistency is that it blocks the addition of any 
hypotheses (H,f),f such that /I < c(. Particularly, this is the case for any hypothesis of 
the form (H)J’. This happens whatever the hypothesis may be, even if it has nothing 
to do with the cause of partial inconsistency. 
Again, one possible way to overcome this blocking effect is to relax the con- 
straints underlying such hypotheses. For instance if we use hypotheses of the form 
(N,:) such that I:+ X, instead of (H) in the formula [x]in-area(X) A (H)suspect(X) - 
[;I A x]suspect(X), it becomes consistent to make the hypotheses (H,)suspect(.joan) and 
(H,,) suspect( postman). 
In the previous example, the partial inconsistency came from the set S. But partial 
inconsistency may also result from the addition of some hypothesis by the following 
example. 
Example 4.2. Let us consider the variant of Example 4.1 in which we consider as a 
possible exception to the rule concerning the phone answering machine, the case where 
the owner of the machine is sleeping. The hypothesis theory considered is now: 
S = { [ T]quarrel(angel), [ T]in-area(joan), [ T]phone_answ-on(angel), 
[PIin-area(postman), [o]athome(angel). 
[ T ]( athome( angel) 3 alibi( angel)), 
[r](quarrel(X) -+ motive(X)), 
[.u]phone_answ-on(X) A (H) 7 sleeping(X) --f [p A X] 1 at-home(X), 
[.u]motive(X) A (H,) 7 alibi(X) ---f [6 A x]suspect(X), 
[_r]in-area(X) A (H)suspect(X) -3 [i’ A x]suspect(X)} 
Hyp = { (H,) 1 alibi(angel), (H) suspectCjoan), (H) suspect( postman), 
(H) 1 sleeping(ange1)). 
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In this hypothesis theory, the set S is no more partially inconsistent since it is not 
possible to derive [p]~ athome(ange1) without making the assumption (H) 1 sleeping 
(angel). Thus we may consider adding the assumption (H) 1 sleeping(ange1). But under 
this assumption, it becomes possible to derive [p]lathome(angel) and thus [olfalse. 
But this partial inconsistency is incompatible with any hypothesis of the form (H)f, 
including (H) 1 sleeping(ange1) itself. Therefore such a hypothesis cannot belong to 
any extension. In this case the only extension is strongly consistent and is generated 
by adding to S the set {(HE) -, alibi(angel), (H) suspect(postman), (H) suspect(joan)}. 
Again, we could avoid the blocking effect on (H) 1 sleeping(ange1) by relaxing the 
hypothesis to (H,) 1 sleeping(ange1). 
Formulated in standard default logic, the theory ( W,D) corresponding to this example 
would neither admit an extension because 1 athome(ange1) would have to be inferred 
by default, which would contradict the fact that athome(angle) would belong to W. 
Thus, graded hypothesis theories, which always admit an extension, may give more 
intuitive results to such theories. 
Let us consider another example exhibiting a similar behavior. 
Example 4.3. The Reiter’s default theory d = { W,D} with W = {German(Karl), 
1 drink-beer(Kar1)) and D = {G erman(X): 1 anti-alcoholic(X)/drink-beer(X)} has no 
extension. The absence of an extension for this default theory is not very satisfactory. 
One expects that the theory admits at least one extension containing German(Kar1) and 
1 drink-beer(Kar1)). The corresponding standard hypothesis theory [41] is 
S = {L German(X) A H 1 anti-alcoholic(X) --) L drink-beer(X), 
L German(Karl), L 7 drink-beer(Kar1)) 
Hyp = {H 7 anti-alcoholic(X)}. 
Note that this theory admits one extension 7H 7 anti-alcoholic(Kar1) without contain- 
ing L anti-alcoholic(X). This is a case where the correspondence criterium between 
extensions in default logic and hypothesis theories is not verified. 
Let us consider a graded version of this theory such as 
S = {[x] German(X) A (H,) 1 anti-alcoholic(X) ---f [y A xldrink-beer(X), 
[ T]German(Karl), [T] 7 drink-beer(Karl)}, 
Hyp = {(He) 1 anti-alcoholic(X)}, E + y. 
This theory has one y-inconsistent extension containing [yldrink-beer(Kar1) and [T] 1 
drink-beer(Kar1). This expresses that Karl surely does not drink beer, but since he is 
German, the fact that he drinks beer is supported with the graded y. 
More generally, any default theory (W, D) containing a default (p : q/r) the justi- 
fication of which is not contradicted and such that -r belongs to W, does not admit 
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any extension. Represented as the graded hypothesis theory 
S = {blp~ (fL)q - b A ~l~~[Jb~[Pl~~~~ HYP = {(H,)q). 
it has a y A /3-inconsistent extension, provided E$ ;: A 8. 
4.2. Automatic relaxing of’ the strength of hypotheses 
As it has been seen in the previous examples, one possible solution to avoid the 
blocking effect, when trying to add new hypotheses in the case of partial inconsistency, 
is to relax the strength to hypotheses by substituting a hypothesis of the form (H)J 
by a hypothesis (H,)f. In such a case the hypothesis is no more blocked by partial 
inconsistency, provided the level of inconsistency x is such that E $ c(. This requires to 
have an a priori knowledge of the level of partial inconsistency. It is therefore very 
difficult to find the right E. 
Another possibility is to consider hypothesis schemes of the form (H,)J’ where x 
denotes a variable ranging on the set of grades r. The idea is then to try to add r- 
instances of such hypothesis schemes obtained by replacing lattice variables by grades 
of r. This amounts to building up extensions of the graded hypothesis theory HT’ = 
(S,Hyp’) instead of HT, where Hyp’ is the set of all r-instances of hypotheses of Hyp. 
For instance, let us consider the theory HT = ({[x A j] 1 p}, { (H,)p}) with r = 
(1,~ A B,x,B>r v B,T} such that r and fi are not comparable. Then HT’ has one 
extension containing [X A fi] 1 p, (H,) p, (HP) p but neither (H,,p) p nor (H_L) p. 
Given a hypothesis scheme (H,)A, the weakest assumption corresponding to this 
scheme may be obtained by instantiating x to T, which amounts to saying that 7.4 is 
not certain. By instantiating x with smaller and smaller grades of r we make stronger 
and stronger assumptions. When building an extension, we try to construct maximally 
consistent subsets of r-instances of hypothesis schemes. In fact, because we know that, 
whenever r,b E r such that r -X /3, then (H,)A --f (Hb)A, this amounts to finding, 
for each hypothesis scheme of Hyp, minimal grades, such that the corresponding I’- 
instances preserve consistency. Let us illustrate this with a more complicated example: 
Example 4.4. 
HYP = {(H,‘)q> (K)r]. 
Since, [x]p E S, we may consider using both defaults [x]p A (HY)q + [6 A x]r and 
[x]p /I (H,)r + [y 11x1s to derive new results. From [p] 7 q E S follows a first constraint 
on possible r-instances of (HY)q such that y$ /?. Under this condition it is possible 
to derive [ci A c(]Y. Concerning the second default, there is nothing a priori restricting 
270 P. Chatalic et al. I Theoretical Computer Science I71 (1997) 247-280 
possible instances of (H,)r thus we may consider using the second default to derive 
[y~a]s. But since [w]sES, this causes [yAaAo]false to be derivable. As a consequence, 
the constraints y# y A c( A o and z# y A a A w must hold as well. 
One noticeable advantage of this way of building extensions is that it automat- 
ically determines the strongest levels at which a given formula may be assumed 
while preserving consistency. Note that these levels are not determined independently 
for each hypothesis scheme. There might exist constraints between several hypothe- 
ses. For instance, let us consider the hypothesis theory HT = (S,Hyp) where S = 
{[cc] 1 p V [/3] 7 q} and Hyp = {(H,)p, (H,)q}. To build up extensions of HT we may 
consider adding to S the hypothesis (Hl)p. It is consistent with S but implies (H,)p 
and thus [b] 7 q. Now to make a hypothesis of the form (H,)q we have to choose I-- 
instances of z such that z $ /?. Conversely, if we add to S the hypothesis (HL)~ then 
we can only add r-instances of (H,)p such that y # a. We thus obtain two different 
extensions, one containing [a] 1 p and (Hljq, and the other one containing [fi] 7 q and 
VU P. 
4.3. Extending the class of hypothesis schemes 
The approach sketched in Section 4.2 has also some drawbacks. The first point is that 
there is no limit to the extent to which constraints are relaxed. The initial motivation 
for introducing hypotheses of the form (H,)p was the possibility of still making some 
hypothesis whenever the opposite formula is weakly supported. But if lattice variables 
are allowed to vary on the whole lattice r, the only case where all r-instances of 
some hypothesis scheme are rejected is the case where the negation of the assumed 
formula is certain. 
Example 4.5. Let us consider the following graded hypothesis theory: 
S = {[TIP, Ml-q, [LIP A (Hdq + [a A ~lr> and HYP = {(H,)qI, 
with r = {I, Z, /I, 6, T} and such that I+ 6 + x -X p + T. 
Let us suppose that 3 denotes a rather strong level of certainty. The only r-instance 
of (H,)q that may be consistently added to S is (HT)q which expresses that 7 q should 
not be certain. This is a very weak assumption. Nevertheless, it is used to derive the 
fact [a]~, which here will be strongly supported. 
Actually, it is not clear whether such derivations are always appropriate. Let us 
consider the case of Paul who often has spelling problems when writing reports. When 
having a problem with some word, he generally checks the spelling with his dictionary, 
unless he believes that this word is not in the dictionary. This may be formalized by a 
default like: [xlspelling-pb( @‘)A (H,)in-dict( W) + [aAx]check( W). Let us consider a 
given word w, which is known to be a problem for Paul (i.e. [Tlspelling-pb(w)) and 
that is believed (but this is not certain) not to be in the dictionary (i.e. [/3] 7 indict(w)). 
In this case we shall probably accept still to use this rule, as long as it is not completely 
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certain that the word is not in the dictionary. Thus we shall use at least the instance 
of the default obtained by substituting y by T. 
Conversely, let us suppose that the first default of Example 4.2 is expressed by 
(x]motive(X 1 A (H,.) 1 alibi(X) 4 [6 A x]suspect(X) and suppose we have a strong (but 
not certain) evidence that Angel has an alibi. In such a case we probably would not 
want to use an instance of this default to conclude that Angel is suspected. 
Notice that although both sets of formulas have the same syntactical structure, we 
are not expecting the same behavior in both cases. Such a difference is clearly related 
to our interpretation of these formulas. Intuitively, one is more willing to relax the 
strength of hypotheses in the first case than in the second case, Actually there might 
be some cases where we do not want the strength level of hypothesis to be relaxed as 
much as possible. 
One simple way to limit the level of relaxation is to label hypothesis schemes by 
more general lattice expressions involving constants as well as lattice variables. For 
instance using a hypothesis scheme of the form (HZAi)f‘, we may set up an upper bound 
to the level of relaxation since whatever the r-instance of x, the strength level is such 
that I < s( ,\ s < x. Such a hypothesis scheme thus allows us to perform automatic 
relaxation of the strength of the hypothesis up to the limit c(. 
4.4. Restricting the notion of extension to limit puvtial inconsistency 
Another drawback of systematic relaxation is that by unlimited weakening of the 
strength of hypotheses, more and more defaults become applicable. This may result in 
an increased level of partial inconsistency, which in turns leads to relax even more the 
strength level of hypotheses. 
Example 4.6. Let us consider the following graded hypothesis theory: 
S = {[TIP, [4lq, [filer> [xlp A (Hy)q - [u A xlr) and BYP = {(H,.)q]. 
with r = { I,m,/3,6,T}. For simplicity, let us suppose that r is totally ordered: i < 
ii+Ct-Xfl-XT. 
Since [6] 1 q ES, we cannot use an instance of y such that y < 6. We may consider 
adding (H,)q and then infer [a]r. But because of [fl] 7 Y, this produces an cc-inconsistent 
result. As a consequence, (H,)q has to be mrther relaxed and we just keep (H,i)q. 
More generally, we have seen that given a hypothesis scheme (H,)J’, if the formula f 
is not believed with full certainty, then it is consistent to add at least the r-instance 
obtained by substituting x by T. This means that unless we are certain of 1 ,f’, all 
defaults based on this hypothesis are applicable when its preconditions are satisfied. 
Since this should be the same for a majority of hypothesis schemes, we may expect a 
lot of partial inconsistencies in the extensions resulting of those very weak assumptions. 
Again, one way to tackle this problem may be to use hypothesis schemes of the form 
(H,,,), which fix an upper bound to the level of relaxation. 
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Another (complementary) solution could be to require extensions to preserve a cer- 
tain level of partial consistency, For instance, one may restrict the generation of ex- 
tensions to those which are &-consistent. 
Definition 4.1. An &-extension of a graded hypothesis theory HT = (S,Hyp) is a set 
E = Thx(S U H) where H is a maximal subset of the set of r-instances of hypothesis 
schemes of Hyp. such that E is &-consistent. 
One simple solution for enforcing &-consistency is to look for extensions of the ex- 
tended hypothesis theory HT’ = {SU{ (H,)tme}, Hyp}, where (H&rue = 1 [E] 1 true = 
7 [&]false. 
Theorem 4.1. Let HT = (S,Hyp) be a graded hypothesis theory and let E = 
Thz(S U H). Then E is an &-extension of HT ifs E’ = Thz{S U {(H,)true} U H) 
is an extension of HT’ = (S U { (H,)true}, Hyp). 
The proof may be found in the appendix. 
5. Related work 
The expression graded modal logic has also been used by Van der Hoek in [43]. 
Although this work is also motivated by the representation of uncertain knowledge by 
means of modal operators, it differs from ours in a fundamental way, since it aims at 
counting the number of exceptional situations in which some proposition p does not 
hold. For this, an infinity of necessity operators [n] (n E (N) is introduced, such that 
[n]p is satisfied by a (possible) world w if and only if there are at most n worlds W’ 
that are reachable from w and that satisfy the formula 1 p. 
There has been another attempt at translating graded default theories into graded 
hypothesis theories [33]. However, it is not based on a multimodal approach and it 
uses the T setting. The basic idea of this work is to encode any grade M of r by a 
chain of modalities of the form S, = q SU, where S is a sequence of modal operators 
Q and 0, containing a fixed number of q and possibly some 0, provided they are 
not placed at consecutive places in the chain. Such an encoding is made possible by 
the fact that the logic T contains an infinity of distinct modalities represented by such 
chains. The author shows that for a given set of grades r, it is possible to define a 
mapping 4 : ct H S, such that all chains S, contain the same number IZ of q , and 
such that YCX, p E r, c( < p iff Spp --f S,p is an axiom of the system T. Uncertain 
beliefs are then represented by formulas of the form Spp. A noticeable drawback of 
this approach is that it is not incremental. If new grades are introduced, it is necessary 
to reconstruct the encoding. To perform graded inference in the same way as graded 
modus ponens does, the author proposes to use the inference rule: 
S&P SCzO(P + 4) 
S,W 
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A graded default theory A = (W,D), is then translated into the hypothesis theory 
HT = (S,Hyp), where 
S={S,op: (~a)EW}u{S,(opAHq--tar): (p:qirx)tD} 
Hyp = { CY Hq : q t Just(D)} 
The author justifies the introduction of an extra necessity operator q after any chain S, 
by technical reasons. In our formalism (apart from the fact that we use the system K ), 
the corresponding translation would require us to replace any chain S, by a modal 
operator [xl, and to use an extra modal operator of necessity q . This would give 
S = {[~(]np/(pa)~ W} U {[r](opA Hq + UP: (p : q/rrA)ED} 
Hyp = {[T]Hq: qEJust(D)}. 
It has been stressed earlier that the basic principles underlying uncertainty handling in 
this graded logic approach are those of possibilistic logic [24, 131. Possibilistic logic 
is a numerical formalism, in which uncertain formulas are expressed by pairs of the 
form (f(N x)) where f denotes a classical formula and (N CY) expresses that z is a 
lower bound of the necessity (i.e certainty) degree of ,f. The set of values which are 
used to characterize necessity degrees is totally ordered. The syntax of the language 
is thus simpler since it does not allow for nesting of graded formulas. The semantics 
is also different since interpretations are considered as fuzzy sets on the set of clas- 
sical interpretations. Although the approach does not address the problem of building 
extensions of a given theory by adding new hypotheses, the language makes it also 
possible to consider theories containing formulas of the form (.f’(L’ a)). Such formulas 
are used to express that the possibility degree of the formula f‘ is greater than Z. 
The notion of possibility is dual to the notion of necessity and satisfies the condition 
D(f) = 1 -N(-f). Stating that D(f)>rx, thus amounts to stating that iV(~f)b 1 -x. 
Such a piece of information could be expressed in our graded logic approach by for- 
mulas of the form -[PI 7 f for any grade /3 such that 1 - M < b and thus roughly 
corresponds to the syntactic notion of hypothesis. By using grades ranging onto the in- 
terval [O,l], it is easy to define an inverse relation on the set of grades. In our approach 
it would be more satisfactory to use such inverse values to characterize the strength 
of hypotheses. Then, the higher the value, the stronger the corresponding hypothesis 
would be, which seems better from the intuitive point of view. Problems induced by 
partial inconsistency in possibilistic logic have also been investigated in [24]. Besides 
the cases of full consistency or inconsistency, two other kinds of inconsistency have 
been identified, namely weak inconsistency and partial inconsistency. While the latter 
corresponds to our own definition of partial inconsistency (i.e. it is possible to derive 
a formula of the form [xlfalse) the former one has no counterpart in our framework. 
In fact it corresponds to theories where it is possible to have simultaneously con- 
straints like N(f)>% and Z7(~f)>p. But the latter constraint amounts to saying that 
N(f‘) < 1 - fi and this gives a contradiction whenever x > 1 - fl. In our approach this 
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would amount to having simultaneously [rx]f and -[ 1 - /3]f which, if CI > 1 - B, would 
give a strong contradiction. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented a formalism which allows for the simultaneous han- 
dling of uncertain and incomplete information. It is based on a qualitative approach, 
where the uncertainty is represented by means of partially ordered symbolic grades, 
interpreted as lower bounds of levels of certainty. However such grades are not in- 
tended to be used for expressing preferences or priorities among the set of beliefs. The 
framework is based on a multimodal logic, in which grades are expressed as modal 
operators attached to logical formulas and for which a sound and complete first order 
axiomatization has been provided. 
We have shown that Siegel and Schwind’s notion of hypothesis may naturally be 
integrated into this multimodal graded logic. We have extended the framework and 
shown that most properties of hypothesis theory are preserved in graded hypothesis 
theory. The proposed semantics differs from the original one of Siegel and Schwind’s 
approach. Modal formulas are interpreted as graded beliefs instead of known formulas. 
As a consequence, it is not necessary to introduce a new modal operator for hypotheses 
and these may be given a clear semantics with respect to beliefs. Actually, hypotheses 
may be considered as constraints restricting the set of possible beliefs. More precisely, 
the addition of the hypothesis (Hjq excludes the possibility of having any support in 
lq (i.e. to have [a] 7 q, for any grade a). Weaker forms of hypotheses, like (H,)q, 
may also be considered to express relaxed constraints precluding beliefs of the form 
[p] 1 q where Baa. 
The resulting framework offers two non-exclusive possibilities to express imperfect 
knowledge. By using graded implications, it is possible to perform graded deductions, 
combining the various levels of support involved in the reasoning processes. The con- 
clusions of such deductions may be uncertain but are derived in a monotonic way. 
Defeasible (and possibly uncertain) conclusions may be obtained by considering the 
addition of hypotheses consistent with the initial theory. We have seen that enlarging 
the class of possible hypotheses may contribute to obtain more intuitive results in a 
number of situations where the expected results may vary according to the interpreted 
strength of several grades. The use of relaxed form of hypotheses also proves to be 
very useful in the case of partially inconsistent theories, where alternative definitions 
of extensions may be worth considering. 
We have not yet investigated the complexity of our system. Without the automatic 
relaxation of beliefs, it is the complexity of the underlying nonmonotonic modal logic 
[18]. But the process of automatic relaxation of hypotheses as described in Section 4.2 
may augment further the complexity, since then we have to compare subsets of the 
knowledge base, namely those obtained by instantiating the variable grades by constant 
grades. 
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A possible extension to this work could be to look for alternative translations ot 
graded defaults into hypothesis theory. For instance we might consider the translation 
of a graded default (p : q/r n) into a formula of the form (H)q - [a](p + Y) or [c(]( pi 
(H)q 4 r). Such translations would lead to different notions of extensions and might 
prove to have (or not) other interesting properties (case analysis, contraposition,. .). 
We could also try to integrate in some way the level of relaxation of some hypothesis 
into the grade of the conclusions derived using this hypothesis. Intuitively, one would 
like to be able to express that the more the strength level of some hypothesis is relaxed 
the less confidence we should have in the corresponding conclusion. However such a 
behavior is difficult to achieve in practice. The first problem is that it would probably 
be difficult to evaluate how much the grade of the relaxed hypothesis should be taken 
into account into the conclusion. The second point is that this would require some kind 
of inverse relation on the lattice of grades, which would probably be difficult to define 
in all the cases. 
Another point with investigating is the possible links between this work and so 
called argumrntatice inference approaches, which purpose is to confront arguments in 
supporting a formula (i.e. reasons to belief in) to arguments against this formula [42]. 
Similarly, in our logic it is possible to have simultaneously formulas [cc]p and [b] 1 17. 
Several proposals have already been made concerning argumentative approaches in 
the framework of possibilistic logic [I]. Given the connections between our work and 
possibilistic logic our approach may also benefit from the results of [l]. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The proof of the soundness of Cr is obvious and goes along 
the same lines as usual, by induction on the length of derivations. The completeness 
proof is based on Henkin’s completeness proof for classical logic [20] and is along the 
same lines as [37]. Given a consistent set of formulas, we define a canonical model 
satisfying this set. 
Definition A.I. A set S of formulas is called complete if 
(I ) S is consistent. 
(2) S is maximal, i.e. K4 EP(S), if A @ S then S U {A} is inconsistent. 
(3 ) S is saturated, i.e. for every existential formula of the form 3~4 E S, there is a 
formula A,[c] ES for some constant c. 
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Lemma A.1. Every consistent set of formulas can be extended to a complete set of 
formulas. 
The following properties of a complete set of formulas are straightforward. 
Lemma A.2. Let S be a complete set of formulas. Then: 
(a) ~~AES then 1A $S, 
(b) if A E Y*(S) and A $! S then 1A E S, 
(c) z~AES and BEY*(S) and k A + B then BES, 
(d) ~~AvBES then AES or BES, 
(e) ifA V BE-Y*(S), and AES or BES, then A V BES, 
(f) for any closed term a in Y*(S), if Ax[a]ES then ~xAES, 
(g) if ~xAES then there is a term a in Y*(S) such that A,[a] ES. 
Definition A.2. Let S be a complete set of formulas and let a E r. We define S” = 
{A: [cc]A ES}. 
Property A.l. (a) V’a, /?J E r if a < p then SB C S’; (b) t’a, p E r SaVB = S” n SD. 
Proof. (a) Let AESP. Then by definition of SD, [fl]AeS. Since tl4 B, by AZ we know 
that k [p]A ---f [cc]A. Since S is complete, by Lemma A.~(c) this implies [a]A ES. But 
then AES”. 
(b) Since CI < 51 v /I and /? < a V /?, by (a) we know that SaVP C: S” and S”‘p 5 Sp 
and thus S”“p C S” n SD. Conversely, let A ES” n SB, by definition of S” and Sfi this - 
implies [a]A ES and [PIA ES and thus [a]A A [/?]A ES. By Property 2.2(f) we know 
that k~ [a v /I],4 c--) [a]A A [DIA. Since S is complete, by Lemma A.~(c) this implies 
[M V &A ES and thus A E S’“b. Hence S’ n Sfi C S”“p. 0 
Definition A.3. A system Y of sets of formulas is called complete if 
(a) Every element of Y is a complete set of formulas. 
(b) For every SE Y and for every A E Y*(S), if Sa U {A} is consistent then there 
is S’ E Y such that S” U (A} C S’. 
Lemma A.3. For every complete set of formulas S, there is complete system of sets 
Y with SEY. 
Now we define the relations R,, SI E I-. 
Definition A.4. Given a complete system of sets 9, we define a family (Ra)aEf 
of binary relations on 9’. 
V’a~r, VS, S’EY, SR,S’ iff S”CS’. 
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Lemma A.4 Let .Y he a complete system of sets and (Rx),,,- as d+ned in Dgfini- 
tion A.4, then 
(a) ‘d’x, p E r, ij’ x < p then R, 2 R/j, 
(b) ‘dx, P E r, R,v/I C R, U Rg, 
(c) RT is serial (i.e., ‘dSg.Y, ~S’E.Y such that RT(S,S’)). 
Proof. (a) Let x, p E f such that r < p and let S,S’ E .Y such that S R, S’. By definition 
of R,, this is equivalent to S” C S’. But since S is complete and r 5 /j we have S/j C S’ 
by Property A.l(a). Thus, we have SB C_S’, i.e. S R/IS’. Hence R, C Rg. 
(b) Let J, [j E r and let S,S’ E Y such that S Rzvo S’. By definition of R,,,i; we 
know that R ?“b(S, S’) iff S’“fi C: S’. Let us suppose that we neither have S” 2 S’ nor 
Sp C S’. Then there must exist some formula A such that [x]A E S but A $2 S’ and _ 
some formula B such that [/j’]EI E S but B @ S’. Since S’ is a complete set. this 
implies 7A E S’ as well as 7B E S’ (Lemma A.2(b)) Since k 7A A 1B - 7 (A V B) 
and since S’ is complete, this implies (Lemma A.~(c)) ‘(A V B) E S’. Since S is a 
complete set, and since t [cc]A + [x](A V B) as well as E [fl]B + [fi](A V B) (by 
RK,), we have (Lemma A.~(c)) [z](A V B) E S and [b](A V B) E S. By Al we have 
t @](A V B) A [p](A V B) --f [cx V /31(x4 V B). A gain, since S is complete this implies 
that [x V p](A V B) ES. But by definition of R,,,b, this implies that A V B E S’. But this 
contradicts the consistency of S’. Hence either S R, S’ or S R,i S’. 
(c) Let St.‘/. Since ET [Tlfalse (DT) and S is consistent, [Tlfalse cannot belong 
to S. Hence false 4 ST and ST is consistent. Let A E Y*(S) such that ST U {A} is 
consistent. Since Y is a complete system, we know that there is some S’ E .Y such 
that ST U {A} C S’ (Definition A.3). From this we get ST 2 S’. hence RT(S.S’). Since 
this holds for any SE.Y. it follows that RT is serial. 11 
Lemma AS. Let 9 he a complete system of‘ sets. let SE .Y. Then [r]A ES if’,4 ES’ 
fbr ecer-y S’ ltith S R, S’. 
Proof. Let S E .Y. 
(+) By definition of S”, [alA ES iff A ES’. Let S’ E .Y, by definition of R,, S R, S’ 
iff S” i S’. This implies A ES’. 
(+) Let us suppose that V’s’ E Y if S R, S’ then A ES’. We show first that S” U (1A } 
is inconsistent. Assume that S”U {lA} is consistent. Then there exists S’EJ~ such that 
S”U{-A} C S’ from Definition A.3(b). Hence S” 2 S’ and therefore S R, S’. A ES’ from 
the precondition and therefore 1A $! S’ by Lemma A.2(a) (since S’ is complete). This 
contradicts S” u {‘A} C S’. Hence Sa U { TA} is inconsistent and there exist formulas 
A,,...,Ak ES” such that i- 1Al V ... V -Ak VA. Then Al A ... A Ak + A is also 
a theorem from which follows t [%]A, A ... A [c(]A~ + [x]A (by RK,). But since 
~1,. . .Ak E S”, [r]Al,. . , [a]Ak E S. Since S is complete this implies [alA t S by 
Lemma A.2(b). 0 
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Now we are in a position to define an Xr-structure for a consistent set of formulas 
So. The domain will be the set of ground terms of _Y*(So). 
The Zr-structure for So is defined as follows. A4 = ( W, &, (Ra)lE~), where 
(1) W is a complete system of sets for So as defined in Definition A.3. 
(2) (Rakf are the accessibility relations as defined in Definition A.4. 
(3) VW E W, J&‘(W) = (O,F,,P,) is a classical structure, where 
(3.1) The domain 0 is the set of ground terms of Z*(&). 
(3.2) F, corresponds to a set of functions f(w) that satisfy f(w)(tr,. . ., t,,) = 
f(tl,...,tn). 
(3.3) P, corresponds to a set of relations P(w) that satisfy (tt,. . . ,t,) E P(w) 
iff P(tl,...,t,)Ew. 
We now consider a r-interpretation I, based on this X$-structure A4 such that at each 
world w of W each term t is interpreted by itself, i.e. VW E W, IC(w)(t) = t. The truth 
value T(w,A) for a closed formula A at a given world w of W is defined inductively 
by the above definition of functions and predicates (3.1)-(3.3). 
Lemma A.6 For every closed formula A E Y*(S)I,, w k A zf A E w. 
Proof. The proof is straightforward by induction over the structure of the formulas 
using the Lemmata A.2 and A.5. 0 
Completeness Theorem. Zf b f then kz f. 
Proof. Assume that there is a valid formula f which is not deducible in 2~. Then 
{-f} is consistent and, by Lemma A. 1, it can be extended to a complete set of 
formulas So such that -f E S. By Lemma A.3, there is a complete system of sets 
Y with So E Y. From .Y, we may then constrnct a Xr-structure for So and a r- 
interpretation lo based on So for which Lemma A.6 holds. In the world So we have 
in particular lf E So and thus, by Lemma A.6, lo,& /= -, f, i.e. lo,& k f which 
contradicts the validity of f. 0 
Theorem 4.1. Let HT = (S,Hyp) be a graded hypothesis theory and let E = Thx(SU 
H). Then E is an &-extension of HT ifsE’ = Thc(SU {(H,&-ue} UH) is an extension 
of HT’ = (S U {(HE) true}, Hyp). 
Proof. Let E = Thz(SUH) and E’ = Th~(SU{(H,)true}UH), with H subset of Hyp. 
We first show that E is c-consistent iff E’ is consistent By definition of s-consistency, 
E is e-consistent iff [alfalse $ E, i.e., iff S U {(H,)true} U H is consistent iff E’ is 
consistent. 
Now we show that E is maximally c-consistent iff E’ is maximally consistent. 
Assume that E is maximally a-consistent and suppose that E’ = Thr(SU { (H,)true} U 
H) is not maximally consistent. Then there is a r-instance h of some hypothesis scheme 
of Hyp, such that h $! H and S U {(H,)true} U H U {h} is consistent. Because E is 
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maximally i:-consistent, S U H U {h} is &-inconsistent. Thus [alfalse E Thz(S U H U {h} ), 
which is equivalent to 1 (HJtrue E Thx(S U H U {h}), contradicting the consistency of 
Su {(H,:)true} u H u {k}. H ence E’ is maximally consistent. 
Conversely, assume that E’ is maximally consistent and suppose that E is not max- 
imally c-consistent. Since E is a-consistent, then H is not maximal. Therefore there is 
a r-instance k of some hypothesis scheme of Hyp, such that k @ H and S ci H u {k} 
is c-consistent. Consequently, [clfalse is not derivable from S U H U {k}. Therefore 
S U H U {k) U { (HJtrue} must be consistent. But this would contradict the maximality 
of H. Hence E is maximally a-consistent. 
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